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Specialisation strategies in Norwegian 
shipping – a Vernon product cycle approach 
 
 
 
Abstract 
One of the most important developments in the postwar shipping industry from the 1960s 
onwards has been the introduction of specialised ship types that have gained market shares in 
the transport of a large number of cargoes. The share of specialised tonnage in the Norwegian 
fleet increased from less than one per cent in 1960 to more than thirty per cent by 1987. 
 This trend towards increased specialisation did not occur to the same extent in all 
maritime centres. Norwegian owners held a large share of the new ships, but even within 
Norway there were substantial differences. Specifically, a disproportionate share of the 
specialised Norwegian ships was owned by shipping companies in the city of Bergen. In 1977 
Bergen companies owned around fourteen per cent of the aggregate Norwegian fleet, but 
almost half of the specialised tonnage. The Bergen presence was particularly strong in two 
segments; chemical tankers and open hatch bulk shipping. 
 After the introduction of a theoretical framework and a presentation of the increasing 
degree of specialisation within Norwegian shipping, the paper looks more closely at the 
Bergen participation in the two segments mentioned above. Through closer studies of the 
companies involved it becomes evident that three factors – cooperation between individual 
companies, vertical integration and technological innovation – can explain the strategic shifts. 
SNF Working Paper No 20/09 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
The most common unit of analysis in shipping history studies is „the national fleet‟ – the 
Greek or Greek-owned fleet, the Norwegian or Norwegian-flagged fleet, etc.
1
 Behind this 
generalisation lies the assumption that there are specific common traits – investment 
behaviour, market orientation and other business strategies – that characterise shipowners in a 
particular country. At the other end of the spectrum, shipping company histories frequently 
eschew the general, looking solely at factors specific to the companies in question. While the 
former angle dismisses heterogeneity, the latter perspective too often treats everything 
„outside‟ the company as exogenous, in some cases even ignoring it altogether.2 The aim of 
this paper is to use a combination of these „macro‟ and „micro‟ perspectives to gain new 
insights about structural transformations within shipping and the companies that initiate this 
change. The Norwegian merchant marine in general, and the fleets owned by companies in 
the port of Bergen in particular, are used to illustrate the developments. 
 The paper consists of four parts. The first section provides a theoretical framework in 
which the increased specialisation within shipping can be understood. The subsequent section 
is primarily empirical, and sketches the structural transformation of the Norwegian shipping 
industry from 1960 to 1987, with particular reference to the disproportionate share of the 
specialised fleet registered in Bergen. This period thus includes both the early phase of niche 
investments, from 1960 to 1977, and the maturation and standardisation of the specialised 
segments in the subsequent decade. The third section presents the two niches in which Bergen 
owners played particularly important roles – chemical tanker transports and open hatch bulk 
shipping. In the final part of the paper, three factors that can explain the Bergen dominance 
within these segments – cooperation, vertical integration and technological innovation – are 
analysed. 
                                                 
1
 See for instance Fischer & Lange (2008).  
2
 These claims are of course more valid for „bad‟ research, than for „good‟ research. If done well, a presentation 
of a country‟s shipping sector will analyse the degree of heterogeneity, while a history of a shipping company 
will aim at putting the company‟s activities into a relevant context or framework.   
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I. Specialisation and the product life cycle 
The postwar shipping market has been characterised by a substantial increase in the number 
and share of purpose-built vessels aimed at specialised segments of the market for seaborne 
transport. In 1960 the world fleet mainly consisted of tankers, bulk and general cargo carriers, 
plus a fairly limited number of specialised vessels such as for instance gas tankers. By the mid 
1970s the share of specialised tonnage had increased dramatically. This reflects the fact that 
several cargoes that had previously been transported on conventional vessels could be shipped 
cheaper and more efficiently in specialised ships. Cases in point are cars and chemicals, 
which had traditionally been transported in general cargo vessels. During the 1960s purpose-
built car carriers and chemical parcel tankers took over large portions of this trade, and by the 
middle of the 1970s general cargo ships hardly carried such cargoes at all.  
The increasing specialisation within shipping can partly be explained by new 
technological opportunities, partly by trade growth that secured sufficient demand to warrant 
the introduction of purpose-built tonnage. Norwegian shipowners were at the forefront of the 
move towards specialised shipping, gaining substantial market shares in several of the new 
segments. A previous paper has quantified the structural transformation of their fleets, with 
particular emphasis on the increasingly important role of specialised ships.
3
 The proportion of 
„specialised ships‟ in the Norwegian fleet, based on gross registered tonnage (grt) increased 
from 0.7 per cent in 1960, via 8.2 per cent in 1977, to around 32 per cent in 1987. 
It is not easy to give a precise definition of „specialised ships‟. For the sake of 
simplicity, this paper focuses on ship types that did not exist in 1960 and vessels targeted at 
niches that were relatively small in 1960.
4
 In terms of „the shipping matrix‟, we thus include 
three segments; „contract shipping‟, „industry shipping‟ and „specialised shipping‟.5 The ships 
that are excluded, such as conventional tankers and bulk carriers, operate in the „commodity 
                                                 
3
 See Tenold (2009) for a presentation of this structural transformation.  
4
 The following ship types are characterised as specialised vessels; liquefied gas carriers, passenger and cruise 
ships, chemical tankers, car and vehicle carriers, supply ships, specialised service vessels, open hatch bulk 
carriers and LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship), container and Ro-Ro (roll on-roll off) vessels. The non-specialised 
ships include four types of vessels; conventional bulk carriers, general cargo ships, combination carriers and oil 
tankers. 
5
 See Lorange (2005:23-26) for a presentation of this matrix, which is commonly used to distinguish between 
shipping segments. 
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segment‟, which is characterised by insignificant barriers to entry and very limited potential 
for differentiation. The terms of competition consequently differ from the niches that are the 
focus of this paper. 
One approach that can be used to describe the shift towards increased specialisation at 
the international level is the hypothesis that shipping segments can be characterised by a 
development similar to the one seen in a „Vernon product life cycle‟.6 This framework has 
previously been successfully applied to shipping, for instance to explain the shift of gravity 
from Traditional Maritime Nations (TMNs) to Flags of Convenience and open registers.
7
 In 
this paper, the analytical framework draws upon Vernon‟s hypothesis, but with some 
modification.
8
  
The new specialised segments within shipping develop on the basis of technological 
progress. In the initial „entrepreneurial phase‟, these segments are commonly dominated by a 
limited number of pioneers. The first-mover companies are typically based in TMNs. This 
reflects two elements. First, it is a result of the fact that development and introduction of 
innovations are risky and relatively costly. Within shipping, the new technologies are 
therefore unlikely to be introduced by countries with a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive service provision.
9
 Second, good knowledge of the market and close ties to potential 
suppliers and customers are necessary to succeed with the introduction of new technologies. 
Again, this would favour shipowners in the TMNs. In the „entrepreneurial phase‟, the 
existence of quasi-monopolies, product differentiation or „captive markets‟ lead to a relatively 
high price of the new product or service.
10
 
                                                 
6
 Vernon (1966).  
7
 See Sletmo (1989) or Thanopoulou (1995). The term TMNs may somewhat imprecisely be said to refer to the 
OECD-countries. Open register-ships still fly the TMN-flag, but special provisions apply. 
8
 Vernon (1966), dealing with manufacturing production, international trade and international investment, 
distinguishes between three phases; a new product, maturation and standardisation. Within shipping, it is 
difficult to clearly model the trade and investment effects, and the transition between the latter two phases is 
vague. 
9
 Vernon (1966: 193-194) specifically deals with innovations that substitute capital for labour.  
10
 Yet, as a result of increased efficiency, the price may be low relative to previous alternatives, using older 
technologies. As long as the new technology is not universally available, it may therefore be correct to use the 
term „high profits‟ rather than „high prices‟. In some instances a combination of the two might occur; refer to the 
presentation of the chemical tanker market in Section III. 
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The second „maturing phase‟ in Vernon‟s product life cycle is associated with 
expanding markets and a higher degree of standardisation. Vernon‟s approach, emphasising 
the role of trade and the location of production, is not directly applicable to shipping. 
However, evidence from shipping niches gives an indication of the forces at play. Higher and 
more secure demand and the emergence of accepted standards lead to increasing economies of 
scale. Within shipping, these can be manifest in two areas. First, there are economies of scale 
in supply – both with regard to individual vessels (larger ships) and individual companies or 
pools (larger fleets). Second, owners can reduce the cost of inputs through mass ordering of 
large series of identical ships. This will both lead to lower purchase costs per ship and enable 
cheaper and more flexible operation of the fleet.
11
 As a result of these economies of scale, the 
early entrants are still able to command a „premium‟ revenue-wise, despite the fact that the 
forces that gave an advantage in the „entrepreneurial phase‟ are no longer as strong. 
At the final „standardised‟ stage, price becomes an increasingly important competitive 
parameter, and the „premium‟ that the early entrants could previously enjoy is not as 
pronounced as before. In addition to becoming „standardised‟, the technology now becomes 
more easily accessible. At this stage, older specialised ships become available in the second-
hand market. This implies that parts of the niche have lost the technology- and capital-
intensive character witnessed at the previous stages. Early entrants may still have some scope 
for further diversification, for instance through vertical integration or continuous innovation.
12
 
However, as price becomes the main competitive factor, focus on costs becomes essential. In 
this phase „flagging out‟ to low labour-cost registries becomes a feature even in the case of 
ships operating in specialised segments.       
II. Structural transformations in Norwegian shipping 
In line with the ideas presented in the previous section, the analysis of the structural 
transformation of the Norwegian fleet distinguishes between two different periods. The first, 
                                                 
11
 For instance, with long series, ships can conventiently be replaced by identical tonnage. Moreover, the 
personnel will get more intimate knowledge of technological solutions and can more easily be transferred among 
vessels.  
12
 However, it is not necessarily the case that the company is able to transfer the cost of the innovation to its 
customers to the same extent as before. One result of this may be „over-sophistication‟ of the tonnage; again, 
refer to Section III for examples. 
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from 1960 to 1977, can be seen as a „pioneering‟ or „formative‟ phase, when the specialised 
technologies were new and novel, and the early entrants had first-mover advantages.
13
 During 
the second phase – the decade after 1977 – the degree of innovation was more limited and 
technological standards had been established in most of the niches. While some of the original 
participants maintained substantial market shares, the maturation of the market and 
standardisation of the specialised technology made it easier and less expensive for new 
participants to enter the market.    
Table 1 shows that in the period from 1960 to 1977 the growing share of specialised 
ships primarily reflected a strong increase in the number and tonnage of such vessels.
14
 Other 
market segments saw slower growth, but only one type of vessels, the general cargo carriers, 
was characterised by absolute reduction. In the subsequent period, from 1977 to 1987 the 
increase to some extent reflected growth in the specialised fleet, which almost doubled over 
the period. However, the massive disinvestment in non-specialised types of shipping was in 
fact more important, leading to an even stronger increase in the proportion of specialised 
tonnage. Whilst the general cargo carriers continued their downward trend, the previous 
period‟s expansion was replaced by substantial decline for tankers, dry bulk carriers and 
combination carriers as well. The term „change factor‟ is used to denote the growth (if above 
one) or decline (if below one) of the tonnage from 1960 to 1977 and from 1977 to 1987. 
Table 1. Structural transformation of the Norwegian fleet (1,000 grt), 1960-1987 
Type 1960 Change factor 1977 Change factor 1987 
Tankers 5,914 2.48 14,681 0.32 4,709 
Dry bulk carriers 617 8.62 5,318 0.33 1,772 
Combination carriers 145 26.15 3,792 0.58 2,201 
General cargo 2,355 0.45 1,055 0.27 289 
Specialised ships 64 34.58 2,205 1.9 4,128 
All ships 9,095 2.98 27,051 0.48 13,098 
 
                                                 
13
 This period is analysed in more detail in Tenold (2009). 
14
 The tables and figures in this paper are, unless otherwise stated, based on three purpose-built data sets 
consisting of all Norwegian ships above 5,000 grt. The data sets have been based on Det norske Veritas (1960), 
Det norske Veritas (1977) and Det norske Veritas (1987), but have been supplemented by other sources when 
necessary. The 1987 data set includes Norwegian-owned ships registered abroad. Due to the strict Norwegian 
flag regime before 1980, there is hardly any difference between the Norwegian-flagged and Norwegian-owned 
fleet in the first two data sets. 
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A closer analysis of the data on which Table 1 is based reveals that the driving force behind 
the change varied across segments and periods. In Table 2 the differences between the two 
periods have been decomposed into a „size effect‟ and a „number effect‟. The former is a 
result of growth or reduction in the average size of the ships in the various sub-groups, while 
the „number effect‟ refers to changes in the number of the various vessel types. The data are 
shown as percentages of the level in 1960 and 1977 respectively. For instance, the average 
size of the Norwegian tankers increased by 478 per cent from 1960 to 1977, while the number 
of tankers declined by 57 per cent.  
Table 2. The basis for the structural transformation – all ships (per cent), 1960-1987 
 1960-1977 1977-1987 
Type Size effect Number effect Size effect Number effect 
Tankers 478 % -57 % -3% -67 % 
Dry bulk carriers 138 % 262 % 0% -67 % 
Combination carriers 305 % 544 % -22 % -26 % 
General cargo 19 % -62 % 46 % -81 % 
Specialised ships 31 % 2540 % 27 % 48 % 
All ships 261 % -18 % - 12 % - 45 % 
 
Table 2 illustrates the importance of the growing average size of ships in the period 1960-
1977, a growth that was – in the case of Norway – reversed in the following period.15 
However, the main reason for the strong reduction of the non-specialised tonnage from 1977 
to 1987 was a massive decline in the number of such ships in the Norwegian fleet. In 1977 the 
Norwegian fleet had consisted of 132 specialised vessels and 582 conventional ships. Ten 
years later the number of specialised vessels had increased to 195, while the number of non-
specialised ships had more than halved, to 200 vessels. Consequently, measured by the 
number of ships, the specialised tonnage made up almost half of the Norwegian fleet in 1987. 
However, due to differences in average size, the ships made up slightly less than a third of the 
total gross registered tonnage. 
The structural shifts illustrated in Table 2 reflect the changing dynamics in the market 
for seaborne transport. In the period from 1960 to 1977 Norwegian owners had to some extent 
                                                 
15
 This can be explained by the effects of the shipping crisis on Norwegian owners; see Tenold (2006b) for an 
analysis of this watershed in Norwegian and international shipping. 
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managed to neutralise their labour cost disadvantage through investments in larger and larger 
ships. The average Norwegian tanker increased from approximately 12,500 grt in 1960 to 
more than 70,000 grt by 1977. As the mammoth tanker and bulk carriers were particularly 
hard hit by the shipping crisis, new investments in non-specialised tonnage practically dried 
up. With the market in crisis, cash-strapped Norwegian owners were forced to sell or transfer 
even the largest ships to low-cost flags. 
 From 1977 to 1987 the specialised markets were the only ones that still managed to 
attract Norwegian investments. However, even within these niches, the driving force behind 
the growth differed among various ship types. As seen from Table 3, increases in average size 
were the most important factor behind the growth of the vehicle carrier and cruise fleets, 
while a reduction in the average size of Ro-Ro vessels was more than neutralised by a 
considerable increase in the number of such ships.  
Table 3. The basis for the structural transformation – specialised ships (per cent), 1977-1987 
Type Fleet 1987 (1,000 grt) Size effect Number effect 
Liquefied gas 1,064 51.2 % 95.7 % 
Open hatch 915 27.7 % 41.7 % 
Chemical tankers 960 11.5 % 27.3 % 
Passenger/ cruise 427 25.6 % 22.2 % 
Vehicle carriers 360 60.0 % 40.0 % 
Ro-ro 272 -12.4 % 333.3 % 
 
Due to the limited amount of specialised tonnage in Norway in 1960 a similar exercise would 
have been pointless for the period 1960 to 1977. The strong increase in average size of gas 
and vehicle carriers after 1977 to some extent reflects new technological possibilities, which 
indicates that these niches had not yet reached the „standardisation‟ phase to the same extent 
as the other specialised segments.  
The preceding analysis has illustrated the empirical side of the structural 
transformation of the Norwegian fleet.  However, a number of interesting questions are 
lurking behind these numbers.  Were there any specific patterns in the specialisation, based on 
for instance geography? What characterised the strategies of the companies that engaged in 
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the new segments? To which extent is it possible to identify the stages of the Vernon cycle 
within the individual niches?   
Previous research has indicated that there were indeed substantial regional variations 
in the degree of specialisation.
16
 Bergen, Norway‟s second largest city and a long-standing 
maritime centre, held around 13 per cent of the total Norwegian fleet in 1977, but almost 44 
per cent of the specialised tonnage, as seen in Table 4. Moreover, the investments of Bergen 
shipowners were heavily concentrated within two niches – open hatch bulk shipping and 
chemical tanker transports.  
Table 4. Bergen’s share of the fleet and sub-segments (per cent), 1960, 1977 and 1987 
Bergen‟s share of the Norwegian: 1960 1977 1987 
     - fleet 12.1 13.4 12.8 
     - specialised fleet - 43.9 26.5 
     - open hatch bulk carrier fleet - 85.6 60.4 
     - chemical tanker fleet - 69.6 50.6 
  
There are three possible reasons that the share of specialised tonnage was higher in Bergen 
than in other parts of the country. First, a higher share of Bergen‟s companies might have 
chosen a specialisation strategy. Second, the companies that had chosen to invest in 
specialised ships might have had a more dedicated approach to this strategy – a higher 
„specialisation ratio‟.17 Finally, both of these forces might have been at play. A closer look at 
the data indicates that the third explanation is the correct one.  
  
                                                 
16
 See Tenold (2009). 
17
 The „specialisation ratio‟ is calculated as the specialised ships‟ share of all tonnage owned by the company. 
When looking at more than one company, the average of individual „specialisation ratios‟ would give misleading 
results, as differences in the size of companies would not be taken into account. In these instances, the 
„specialisation ratio‟ refers to the specialised fleets as proportion of all tonnage owned by companies that had 
invested in such ships.   
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Figure 1. Specialisation:  shares of companies and specialisation ratio, 1977 and 1987 
 
Figure 1 shows that a higher share of the Bergen companies had chosen to invest in 
specialised ships and the specialisation ratio was higher among these companies than among 
specialised companies in other parts of Norway. This was evident as early as 1977, and the 
differences were significant in 1987 as well. In the latter year, ten out of the fourteen Bergen-
based shipping companies had invested in specialised ships, and the niche tonnage made up 
more than eighty per cent of these companies‟ fleets.18 Specialised tonnage made up 26 per 
cent of the Bergen fleet in 1977, relative to 5.3 per cent for the rest of the country. By 1987 
the comparable figures were 66.1 per cent and 27 per cent respectively.  
While it is evident that Bergen may be a very good starting point for an analysis of 
specialised shipping, the high degree of specialisation and the concentration on two specific 
niches imply that „general‟ conclusions about the forces at play should not be drawn from this 
example. Nevertheless, the two segments can shed some light upon the processes that 
characterised the development of the two largest specialised niches. 
III. The Bergen niches 
The specialisation of Bergen owners was more „focussed‟ than what we observe for the rest of 
the country. Two niches – chemical tanker transport and open hatch bulk shipping – 
                                                 
18
 It is worth noting that there were ten specialised companies in Bergen in 1977 and 1987. However, the number 
of non-specialised companies declined from thirteen to four.  
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accounted for more than 90% of the specialised shipping investments of Bergen shipowners 
both in 1977 and 1987. Moreover, the Bergen owners – and locally-based ship equipment 
producers – played an important role in the technological development of both niches. In this 
sense, the Bergen shipping milieu can be seen as having many of the properties that Michael 
Porter used to characterise „clusters‟.19  
Chemical tanker transports 
The transport of chemicals in purpose-built tankers was one of the fastest growing niches in 
the period 1960 to 1987.
20
 It is difficult to give a precise definition of the size of the chemical 
tanker fleet, mainly due to borderline vessels that switch between markets depending on 
demand and supply.
21
 However, according to data from brokers, the amount of chemical 
tanker tonnage in the international market increased from around 700,000 dead weight tons 
(dwt) in 1964, via 4.5 million in the mid 1970s, to more than 11 million dwt by 1987.
22
 This 
gives a trend growth of around 14 per cent over the period – substantially stronger than the 
five per cent seen for the world fleet as a whole. 
Before 1960, the limited amounts of chemicals that were transported internationally 
were usually carried in steel drums or carboys on conventional ships. During the 1960s parcel 
tankers – purpose-built ships that could transport different chemical products in bulk – took 
over this trade. The bulk transport concept led to a substantial reduction of transport costs, a 
fact that, together with the strong growth in chemical use and production capacity, led to high 
growth in the internationally traded volume of chemicals.    
                                                 
19
 There are two reasons that the „cluster‟ approach presented in Porter (1990) has not been explicitly used in this 
paper. The first is the fact that the shipping companies‟ role as the core of the Norwegian maritime cluster is 
disputed; see Midelfart Knarvik & Steen (1999). The second reason is that the notion of a „Norwegian maritime 
cluster‟ has been at the centre of a heavily politicised debate within Norway; see Fougner (2006). This does not 
mean that we doubt the strategic and economic importance of the linkages between companies in the Norwegian 
maritime industry. Rather, one of our main explanations of the Norwegian success within shipping niches relates 
to such relationships. 
20
 For a more thorough introduction to this market, see Murphy & Tenold (2008). 
21
 The most obvious example of this is that chemical tankers may trade in the oil product market when demand 
for chemical transport is low, and oil product tankers may carry some „benign‟ chemical cargoes when demand 
is high. 
22
 Based on data from Clarkson (1964), Clarkson (1977) and Drewry (1989:42). 
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 In the mid 1970s, Norwegian shipowners played important roles in the seaborne 
transport of chemicals. Indeed, more than a third of the chemical tanker fleet was registered in 
Norway in 1977, according to data from Lloyd‟s.23 Twelve Norwegian companies had 
invested in chemical tankers above 5,000 grt, implying that this was the niche in which the 
highest number of companies participated. The main centre was Bergen, with more than two 
thirds of the tonnage. 
Figure 2. Leading Norwegian chemical tanker owners, based on grt, 1977 
 
The Odfjell group was by far the leading Norwegian chemical tanker operator, as shown in 
Figure 2. Together with their partners, Odfjell held an international market share of more than 
25 per cent in the sophisticated end of the chemical tanker market.
24
 These ships had been 
classified to allow the transport of all kinds of chemical cargoes, even the most corrosive, 
explosive, inflammable and toxic. 
The basis for Odfjell‟s position was twofold. First, it reflected the fact that the Odfjell 
group from the beginning of the 1960s onwards channelled practically all of their ship 
investments into the chemical tanker sector. Second, it reflected a strategy of cooperation, 
where Odfjell handled the commercial operation of ships owned by other companies. In fact, 
                                                 
23
 Lloyd‟s (1977), Table 2. The other niche with really high Norwegian participation was vehicle carriers, where 
around a quarter of the world fleet was registered in Norway. At the time, the Norwegian share of the world fleet 
was around seven per cent. 
24
 Chemical tankers are classified according to the chemicals they can transport. The sophisticated end of the 
market includes ships that can accept all kinds of chemicals, while the „simple‟ chemical tankers can only accept 
a relatively low number of less hazardous chemicals. 
Odfjell and partners (49%)
Team Tankers (19%)
Bugge/ Schröder (16 %)
Other independents (15%)
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almost half of the tonnage that Odfjell operated commercially was nominally owned by two 
other shipowners – the Bergen-based Westfal-Larsen & Co. AS and Christian Haaland of 
Haugesund. Odfjell had entered the market for transport of chemicals with relatively small 
ships, but increasing demand and new technical possibilities paved the way for larger 
vessels.
25
 Through a combination of strategic cooperation, innovative technological solutions 
and vertical integration, the company managed to gain and defend a substantial market share.  
 As indicated above, the chemical tanker fleet grew massively in the period from 1960 
to 1987. In 1960 the few existing „dedicated‟ chemical tankers – a fleet that hardly surpassed 
100,000 grt – were either relatively small, relatively simple (i.e. dedicated to one or two 
products) or owned by large multinational chemical producers such as Dow and Union 
Carbide. However, as the multinationals decided to outsource the seaborne transport of their 
chemicals, some operators – primarily Norwegian and British owners – managed to gain 
substantial positions in this rapidly growing market. A 1973 report from the shipping 
consultants H.P. Drewry claimed that “Scandinavian interests have almost monopolized the 
ownership pattern for [chemical] parcel tankers.”26 In addition to the Odfjell group, Stolt-
Nielsen, a company controlled by a US-based Norwegian expatriate, the Norwegian-British 
partnership ANCO and the British Athel Line were the dominant players.
27
  
By the mid 1970s Athel and ANCO, after first having merged with each other, merged 
with Panocean, a new contender owned by the British shipping giants P&O and Ocean. The 
three main participants – Odfjell, Stolt-Nielsen and Panocean Anco – then held an aggregate 
market share of almost 80 per cent in the intercontinental market, but much less than this in 
the regional markets. This substantial degree of concentration indicates that the kind of 
„quasi-monopoly‟ suggested by Vernon still applied in the market at this stage – at least for 
the large sophisticated vessels that operated on intercontinental routes. 
                                                 
25
 This illustrates the point made before, that the lower limit of 5,000 grt for the ships included in the database 
may result in neglect of the „really pioneering‟ period of specialisation, in which the waters are tested with small 
vessels. 
26
 Drewry (1973:5). 
27
 Murphy and Tenold (2008). 
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 From the late 1970s onwards, a number of changes occurred in the market. In 
particular, the chemical tanker technology had now become „standardised‟ – to follow 
Vernon‟s vernacular – and a number of new agents entered the market. Specifically, a 
substantial number of relatively small Japanese vessels – built by Japanese shipyards that 
needed orders – contributed to a doubling of chemical tanker supply between 1980 and 1987. 
Through a combination of mergers and buy-outs, the main operators managed to still control 
most of the sophisticated tonnage that performed the long-haul voyages. However, the terms 
of the competition had irrevocably changed and profits were squeezed. 
 Three factors contributed to the „maturation‟ and „standardisation‟ of chemical tanker 
shipping. The first was the introduction of an International Maritime Organisation-endorsed 
Code regulating the transport of chemical cargoes in bulk. To allow the transport of a given 
chemical, ships had to comply with specific standards regarding for instance tank, pump 
system and pipeline construction. This implied that reputation and established relations to 
charterers became less important, reducing one of the advantages of the pioneers. The second 
factor leading to standardisation was the thresholds reached with regard to the technology. 
There was less room for innovation as the technological solutions pioneered by the early 
entrants – including the deepwell-pumps produced by the Bergen-based manufacturer Frank 
Mohn AS – had become relatively commonplace. Finally, by the early 1980s a well-
functioning market for second-hand chemical tankers had appeared, substantially reducing 
barriers to entry. As can be expected from the Vernon framework, this led to the diffusion of 
the technology from countries with comparative advantage in high technology, capital-
intensive shipping, to countries with labour cost advantages.
28
  
In the early days of chemical shipping, a combination of strategic cooperation, 
innovative technological solutions and vertical integration had enabled Odfjell and their 
Bergen compatriots to gain and defend a substantial market share.
29
 The strategic cooperation 
refers to the operation of ships, owned by different owners, on a pool basis. Odfjell 
cooperated with other Bergen shipowners, investing in identical ships and operating these 
commercially as one entity. This secured a fleet that was big enough to offer a comprehensive 
                                                 
28
 See Thanopoulou (1995). 
29
 See Thowsen & Tenold (2008:275-355) or, for a more concise presentation, Tenold (2006a). 
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world-wide service. The company would not have been able to attain a fleet of this size on its 
own due to financial limitations. The most important pool partner was Westfal-Larsen & Co. 
AS, which in the late 1960s and early 1970s more or less matched Odfjell‟s investments on a 
ship-by-ship basis.
30
 Odfjell also operated a series of smaller chemical tankers that were fully 
or partly owned by seven minor shipowners.    
The most important technological innovation was the introduction of versatile, 
stainless steel tanks, as opposed to the less expensive coated tanks that had previously been 
used. The high-quality stainless steel tanks enlarged the market, by allowing safe bulk 
transport of a number of new chemicals. Odfjell and their Bergen partners had a virtual 
monopoly on this technology during the 1960s and early 1970s. Even as late as mid-1978, 
Odfjell‟s stainless steel capacity was around 30% larger than their two most important 
competitors put together. However, in the 1980s most owners invested in stainless steel 
capacity, leading to an „over-sophistication‟ of the tonnage. This expensive technology to 
some extent became the norm, even for chemicals that could have been safely transported in 
traditional coated tanks. The fact that a technological innovation that had previously been 
limited to the pioneers became common, illustrates that the sector had reached the 
„standardisation‟ phase of Vernon‟s framework.  
With regard to vertical integration, the Odfjell group invested in tank terminals in 
various locations. In addition to enabling a more efficient use of their fleet, the terminals 
improved the service offered to charterers.
31
 Another example of vertical integration was the 
company‟s establishment of an in-house brokerage. By taking over the marketing and 
chartering of the vessels in the pool, Odfjell managed to increase operational efficiency and 
maintain their close linkages to the most important customers. This became particularly 
important as international regulations and the fact that ships operated by different owners 
became more and more similar, reduced the scope for technological diversification. 
                                                 
30
 By 1977 Westfal-Larsen contributed approximately 40% of the tonnage in the pool. However, the focus on 
Odfjell is warranted by the fact that this company had been the original pioneer, owned the onshore facilities and 
was responsible for the commercial operation of all ships employed in the pool. 
31
 The other major owners took similar steps, while smaller new chemical tanker operators did not have the 
capacity to offer onshore storage as part of the transport assignment. 
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 While technological innovation and vertical integration played a particularly important 
role in the case of Odfjell, cooperation was an important ingredient for most of the other 
Norwegian chemical tanker operators as well. Three Bergen companies – Det Bergenske 
Dampskipsselskap, Finn Engelsen and Rolf Wigand – participated in the Team Tankers pool, 
which operated in the less sophisticated part of the chemical tanker market. The companies 
transported relatively benign chemical cargoes that were lifted in larger volumes. Outside 
Bergen, companies such as Iver Bugge and Ole Schröder had a history of participation with 
British interests in the Athel-ANCO partnership, while Ruud-Pedersen operated a number of 
chemical tankers that were chartered to Associated Octel to carry lead antiknock 
compounds.
32
 
The chemical tanker industry provides a good illustration of the trend towards 
specialisation in shipping. The niche expanded on the basis of a combination of new 
technological possibilities and rapidly growing trade. High barriers to entry and the limited 
spread of their sophisticated technology implied that Odfjell and their Bergen compatriots 
could still reap the benefits of their first-mover advantage during the 1970s. As the market 
matured, however, the Bergen owners‟ position was weakened. Just like Norway‟s position in 
the international market for chemical transports was diluted, Bergen‟s share of the Norwegian 
chemical tanker fleet declined. 
The share of the world‟s chemical tanker fleet registered in Norway declined from 
more than 35% in 1977 to less than five per cent by 1987.
33
 However, if we take into account 
Norwegian-owned chemical tankers registered abroad, the decline is lower, to around 28% of 
the market. Despite this reduction, the number of Norwegian companies with chemical 
tankers in their fleets increased from 12 in 1977 to 16 by 1987. Nine of these 16 companies 
had entered the segment between 1977 and 1987, while five companies – including the three 
participants in the Team Tankers pool – exited the market.34 The most successful of the 
newcomers, and the only one of the new companies based in Bergen, was JO Tankers. The 
                                                 
32
 Confer Figure 2. 
33
 Calculations based on Lloyd‟s (1977), Lloyd‟s (1987), Det norske Veritas (1977) and Det norske Veritas 
(1987). Over the same period, the share of the world fleet registered in Norway declined from 7% to 1.6%. 
34
 Despite the exit of the original participants, the Team Tankers pool continued with other participants. 
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company was a spin-off from Odfjell, established as the assets of the Odfjell group were 
divided between two branches of the family. By 1984 the offshoot had “moved into the big 
three of the chemicals trade in volume of business and tonnage”35  
Open hatch bulk transports 
In a similar vein to their pioneering roles in the chemical tanker industry, owners from Bergen 
played major roles in the evolution of the open hatch bulk carrier segment.
36
 The 
technological basis was similar in the two niches; “[t]he progressive „bulking‟ of cargoes 
results mainly from increases in volumes on particular routes to levels that justify full 
shiploads of single cargoes and the employment of larger and more efficient ships, and 
investment in specialised handling and storage.” 37 In the chemical tanker industry, the 
introduction of several tank subdivisions with separate pumps and pipelines enabled the 
transport of chemicals in bulk. With regard to the open hatch bulk carriers, improvements in 
cargo handling and storage were of particular importance. Specifically, the introduction of 
larger, more flexible hatch covers and movable gantry cranes gave the ships a competitive 
advantage in the transport of the so-called „neo-bulk‟ commodities.38 Among the most 
important neo-bulk commodities were forest products, steel and cement.  
 While Bergen-based shipowners were reluctant to invest in conventional bulk carriers, 
they managed to carve out a niche within open hatch bulk shipping.
39
 Indeed, the vessel type 
was in many ways a local innovation, developed in cooperation between Star Shipping and 
Sverre Munck AS, a Bergen-based manufacturer of cranes.
40
 The antecedents of Star 
Shipping were originally established in the early 1960s by Per F. Waaler. The son of an 
                                                 
35
 Quote from Fairplay (1984). 
36
 The open hatch bulk carriers do not figure as a separate type of ship in macro statistics such as for instance 
those presented by Lloyd‟s and Veritas, but are lumped in with other types of bulk carriers. In order to identify 
open hatch bulk carriers in the database, information on the breadth of the hatch covers and the crane equipment, 
which distinguish them from conventional bulk ships, has been used. 
37
 Drewry (1982:1). 
38
 The term „neo-bulk‟ refers to shipments of commodities that require specialised shipping and port handling. 
Neo-bulk commodities are differentiated from break-bulk cargoes (less uniform and more difficult to load and 
unload) and bulk cargoes (homogeneous cargoes that are shipped in loose condition).  
39
 See Fon (1995) for an analysis of the emergence of dry bulk shipping as a defined segment.. 
40
 See Bakka (2001). The technology was a refinement of a concept originally developed in cooperation between 
the US pulp and paper company Crown Zellerback and a shipowner in eastern Norway. 
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academic, he pioneered the open hatch concept, but due to lack of funds “cooperation was a 
necessity.”41 Investments started to escalate when several of the „established‟ Bergen 
shipowning families, including Westfal-Larsen, entered the partnership in the middle of the 
1960s. In fact, Westfal-Larsen signed a pool agreement with Star Shipping in February 1963 – 
some 14 months before the company entered into a similar agreement with Odfjell about 
chemical tankers  
By the late 1960s, the backbone of Star Shipping‟s fleet was a series of six purpose-
built vessels – the so-called “C-class” – delivered from Kockums yard in Sweden. However, 
the company continuously upgraded its fleet, introducing newer and more flexible versions of 
the open hatch bulk concept in subsequent deliveries. In order to secure a “critical mass” of 
vessels, newbuilding contracts were at times resold to other owners, and Star Shipping took 
the ships back on timecharter contracts with purchase options. Furthermore, in 1970 the Star 
Shipping partners admitted a third member – Fred Olsen & Co – into the fold. This led to 
more capital available for investment and also secured a partner with substantial experience 
from the liner industry. The latter element became important as Star increasingly relied on 
regular services between specific ports. In particular, containers became important to fill 
transport capacity on the return leg of forest product transport assignments. 
 Although the open-hatch bulk carriers were legally owned by different interests, they 
were operated in a pool under the Star Shipping banner. By 1977 Star Shipping controlled 
approximately 45% of the Norwegian open hatch bulk carrier fleet. Their main competitor – 
with 40% of the fleet – was the Bergen-based Gearbulk pool, as seen from Figure 3. Gearbulk 
had been established by Kristian Gerhard Jebsen, who came from a family with long 
traditions within shipping. He established Gearbulk on the basis of a pool agreement between 
his own newly formed company, the Bergen owner J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi and two 
foreign companies – the French Louis Dreyfus & Cie of Paris and Buries Markes Ltd., a 
British subsidiary of Dreyfus. The companies expanded their open hatch investments rapidly 
in the first half of the 1970s.  
 
                                                 
41
 Nilsen (2001:565).  
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Figure 3. Norwegian owners of open hatch bulk carriers, based on grt, 1977 
 
 Efficiency in loading and unloading gave the open hatch bulk ships a competitive advantage 
in the „neo-bulk‟ market, and the land-sea interface was seen as an integral part of the 
business concept. Consequently, both Star Shipping and Gearbulk established a widespread 
network of personnel in foreign ports, and Star Shipping even invested in a purpose-built 
terminal for forest products in British Columbia. This on-shore element, coupled with the 
need for considerable investments in order to acquire a sufficiently large fleet, led to relatively 
high barriers to entry in the segment. The “C-class” ships delivered to Star Shipping from 
Sweden in the late 1960s represented the definite breakthrough for the open hatch bulk 
concept. Subsequently, the concept was refined, but without radical innovations of the type 
first introduced by Waaler. The ship size was increased substantially with the introduction of 
the “D-class” ships in the mid 1970s. Star Shipping continued to order identical ships in 
batches – the “F-class” and “G-class” ships delivered in the mid 1980s provided further 
refinement of an already successful concept.  
Despite continually investing in new capacity, Star Shipping and Gearbulk‟s 
dominance of the open hatch bulk carrier market, with control of more than 85% of the 
Norwegian fleet in 1977, was reduced in the following decade. Only two Norwegian 
companies outside Bergen owned open hatch bulk carriers in 1977. However, one of these, 
Leif Høegh & Co. AS of Oslo, expanded rapidly on the back of a long-term contract with the 
forest product giant Weyerhaeuser. A well-diversified company – with interests in three of the 
specialised segments – Høegh entered the open hatch niche in the mid 1970s, but controlled 
Gearbulk pool (40%)
Star Shipping pool (45%)
Other independents (14%)
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approximately a quarter of the Norwegian fleet of such vessels by 1987. Four other companies 
entered the segment between 1977 and 1987, but two of these were welcomed into the Star 
Shipping pool as minor participants.
42
 Despite increased competition, the position of the 
original entrepreneurs is still strong; Gearbulk and Star Shipping both remain among the top 
three of the world‟s largest open hatch bulk carrier operators.  
Network effects in Bergen shipping & Vernon’s cycle 
There is a long tradition focussing on regional „networks‟ as an integral component of the 
shipping environment.
43
 In a recent contribution, Boyce has pointed out that close networks 
can “facilitate the execution of an innovative strategy.” An important element here is the 
“bonds of trust”.44 An illustration from the drive towards specialisation in Bergen is the pool 
agreement between Odfjell and Westfal-Larsen – a one page document that lay the foundation 
for a partnership lasting almost a quarter of a century.
45
 According to Boyce, such levels of 
trust, combined with shared cognitive patterns, tend to “promote commitment, resource 
mobilisation, and co-operation.”46 
This type of network effects were undoubtedly at play in the Bergen shipping 
community, and this can explain the city‟s drive towards specialisation and the leading role 
within two of the niches. Specifically, the technological solutions devised by Odfjell and 
Waaler provided Bergen with a head start within two rapidly growing niches and gave first-
mover advantages at the „entrepreneurial‟ stage of Vernon‟s product life cycle. Indeed, 
Odfjell‟s innovations within chemicals shipping and Waaler‟s new concepts in the transport 
of neo-bulk commodities were pioneering efforts. However, the entrepreneurs‟ limited 
financial clout led to cooperation with other local shipowners.
47
 The symbiosis is self-evident: 
                                                 
42
 Star Shipping‟s reduced share of the Norwegian-owned open hatch bulk fleet was to some extent neutralised 
by the company‟s operation of foreign-registered ships on long-term contracts. 
43
 See for instance Boyce (1995) or Harlaftis & Theotokas (2004). 
44
 Boyce (2007:48). 
45
 Thowsen & Tenold (2006:324). 
46
 Boyce (2007:48). 
47
 As the Gearbulk case shows, there were also partnerships with interests that were clearly not locally based. 
However, the local participants were by far the most important, and there is little doubt that geographical 
proximity and already existing relations between the companies facilitated the cooperation. 
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the original entrepreneurs got access to the tonnage necessary to build up sufficient economies 
of scale, while the companies invited into the projects were given access to profitable 
investment opportunities.  
 As the markets reached the „maturation‟ stage, the Bergen shipowners to some extent 
managed to maintain their strong position in the market, despite increasing challenges to their 
position. However, from 1977 to 1987, as the technology had become fully standardised and 
more easily accessible, they were unable to retain their substantial market shares. Moreover, 
at this stage of the product life cycle, the Norwegian participants were subject to increasing 
competition from foreign shipowners, reflecting the fact that the technology was no longer 
exclusive and price had become the main competitive factor.  
 One indicator of the standardisation of the specialised markets is the declining share of 
the world‟s specialised fleet registered in Norway. Among the most important newcomers 
were Asians, Greeks and shipowners operating vessels flying Flags of Convenience. As 
Thanopoulou found; “[n]ations at a less advanced stage of development enter the maritime 
industry producing services that have reached the stage of a more or less „standardized‟ 
product following Vernon‟s product cycle.”48 While we do not have detailed data for all 
segments, Table 5 illustrates the declining trend in several of the specialised markets. 
However, if we take into account Norwegian-owned ships registered abroad there was a small 
increase in the Norwegian-controlled share of the gas carrier fleet.  
Table 5. Norway’s share of the world fleet and important niches, 1977 and 198749 
Norway‟s share of the world fleet of: 1977 1987 1987 (int.) 
Chemical tankers 35.6 4.1 28.1 
Liquefied gas carriers 10.0 7.6 10.9 
Vehicle carriers 25.1 0.35 8.1 
World fleet 7.1 1.6 3.3 
 
                                                 
48
 Thanopoulou (1995:51). 
49
 Calculations based on Lloyd‟s (1977) and Lloyd‟s (1987), Tables 1 and 2, as well as Det norske Veritas (1977) 
and Det norske Veritas (1987). The rightmost column refers to Norwegian-owned ships, rather than vessels 
registered in Norway.  
SNF Working Paper No 20/09 
 
22 
 
An alternative way of illustrating the move from the „entrepreneurial‟ to the „maturation‟/ 
„standardisation‟ stages is to look at the concentration of the market. At the „entrepreneurial‟ 
stage, with quasi-monopolies and limited diffusion of the specialised technology, 
concentration is likely to be high. As the market matures and the technology becomes 
standardised and more easily accessible, in particular through the establishment of second-
hand markets for specialised ships, the degree of concentration is likely to decline. 
While data limitations make an estimation of concentration difficult at the aggregate 
international level, the databases enable us to gauge the changes in market shares among 
Norwegian owners. A useful tool in analysing market concentration is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI). The HHI is based on the relative shares of all firms in the market, 
which are squared and summed up, in order to increase the weight given to larger firms. Table 
6 is calculated on the basis of the various companies‟ or pools‟ shares of the Norwegian fleet. 
One company owning all tonnage in a segment would give an index of 10,000 (a market share 
of 100% squared), a duopoly with two equally large companies would give an index of (50
2
 + 
50
2
) 5,000, while ten companies, each with a market share of 10%, would give an index of 
(10
2
*10) 1,000. The US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1997, p. 
15) considers an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 as a moderately concentrated market, and a 
market with an HHI above 1,800 to be concentrated.   
 
Table 6. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index for specialised segments, 1977 and 1987 
Segment 
HHI HHI with pools Number of companies 
1977 1987 1977 1987 1977 1987 
Chemical 
tankers 
1,419 1,189 3,040 2,325 
12 16 
Open hatch 2,085 1,398 3,819 2,780 6 10 
Liquefied gas 1,499 2,544   11 13 
Vehicle carriers 3,267 1,615 5,288 3,698 5 8 
 
As the calculations in Table 6 are based only on Norwegian data, the figures should not be 
interpreted as an indication of concentration at the international level. Moreover, we are not 
interested in the level of concentration per se, but the development from 1977 to 1987. While 
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the data do not prove that concentration was reduced and competition was improved 
internationally, it illustrates the increasing diffusion of the specialised technologies within 
Norway and the reduced role of the pioneers.
50
  
The number of participants increased in all specialised segments. The HHI declined as 
expected, with the exception of the gas tanker market, which saw increased concentration 
within Norway. This was the result of one dominant company – Sig. Bergesen dy & Co. – 
which entered the market after 1977, but by 1987 had managed to build up a market share of 
almost 45%. With substantial experience as a crude oil tanker operator, Bergesen used their 
links to the oil company Total when gaining their strong position in the liquefied gas 
segment.
51
 Thus, although concentration within this segment developed in the opposite way of 
what one would expect given Vernon‟s framework, it illustrates the increasingly easy access 
to the technology and the limited „protection‟ of the original pioneers.  
Future research 
This paper has discussed the trends towards increasing specialisation of the international 
merchant marine, with a particular emphasis on how a Vernon product life cycle framework 
can be used to analyse the development of the various segments. Changes in competitive 
advantage as the niches moved from the „entrepreneurial‟ stage, via „maturation‟, to the 
„standardised‟ stage are reflected in technology diffusion and changes in ownership. 
Moreover, the degree of concentration changes as the pioneers‟ ability to protect their „quasi-
monopolies‟ is weakened.  
The Norwegian city of Bergen has provided examples of the forces at play in the 
period when the new technology is introduced. Through cooperation, innovation, and vertical 
integration, Bergen shipowners managed to gain substantial market shares in two of the new 
segments. The cooperation was necessary to gain the sufficient „critical mass‟ to utilise 
economies of scale. However, the benefits from innovation and vertical integration declined 
                                                 
50
 For the sake of argument; if there were several small foreign competitors in 1977, but only one foreign 
competitor in 1987, the international indices could move in the opposite direction from that seen in Table 6. 
However, given our knowledge of what happened in other countries – even without numerical evidence – it is 
clear that this was not the case. 
51
 Lorange (2005: 84) 
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as the technology became more widespread – „standardisation‟ in Vernon‟s scheme. This led 
to increased competition both internationally and within Norway. By 1987 the specialised 
vessels were no longer as unique as they had been ten – let alone twenty – years before. 
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